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ETHNO-NATIONAL HOMOGENIZATION IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV AREA

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Abstract: The newly formed nation-states in the former Yugoslavia are an example of ethno-nationalized societies that emerged during the 1990s, as the final phase of the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia. Ethno-national homogenization of societies was realized under the direction of dominant (ethno) nations, which considered the newly formed society as 'property'. Ethno-nationalization proved to be a crucial factor in creating ethnic antagonisms and disintegrating Yugoslav society.

In this paper, the author presents the basic socio-historical assumptions of the emergence and disappearance (dying, extinction, breakdown / disintegration) of the Yugoslav state. Using a modern sociological conceptual and categorical apparatus in the field of political sociology and sociological studies of nationalism, the author presents the processes of ethno-nationalization, ethnic antagonisms and disintegration of a social order, as well as the basic characteristics and structure of ethno-nationalized society. The paper gives indications of possible '(de)ethno-nationalization' and a brief overview of the relationship between cultural and civic nationalism.

Key words: Ethnicity, ethno-nationalization, ethnic homogenization, ethnic antagonisms, SFRY, state, nation.

1. INTRODUCTION

When we speak about the post-Yugoslav area, we primarily refer to the geographical area that included the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), as well as the organization of various entities in that area in the political and state sense.[1]

Issues of national equality of peoples had a very important place in the focus of the new state of SFR Yugoslavia. To that end, the coin 'brotherhood and unity of peoples and nationalities' was created, which was supposed to be the garrantor of their equality in SFR Yugoslavia. The new socialist authorities believed that the national question in SFR Yugoslavia had been adequately resolved, and that every nation could develop in a community of equal peoples and nationalities in a new federal community. Going through different phases of social development, SFR Yugoslavia adjusted the changes in the constitutional and legal sphere to that process.[2] The essence of the constitutional changes was in the increasing decentralization and weakening of the federal institutions in favor of strengthening the republican bodies and giving more and more competencies to the federal units. Yugoslavia was reduced to a geographical term by the 1971 amendments that preceded the 1974 Constitution (Đurić, 1971).

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1   SFR Yugoslavia was a completely new political and state creation with a specific constitutional and legal order, a new form of state organization. It arose in the liberation war of 'its peoples and nationalities' as a form of struggle for liberation, and in the process of revolutionary transformation of the whole society, as a 'socialist revolution', which meant 'transformation of class into classless society' under the leading role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The new Yugoslavia, as SFR Yugoslavia, formed on the ruins of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was considered a 'dungeon for the people' represented a completely new form of government, with a new social, political and state structure, as a 'society of the future' in which many social problems that hampered the overall development of society, stifled the national rights of 'peoples and nationalities' and human freedoms as such.

2   The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state as a state union of voluntarily united peoples and their socialist republics, as well as the socialist autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo which are part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on government and self-government of the working class and all working people, community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities. (Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, 1974. Art.1)

A socialist republic is a state based on the sovereignty of the people and on the government and self-government of the working class and all working people, and a socialist self-governing democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peoples and nationalities. (Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia, 1974. Art.3)

At the beginning of the seventies of the last century, many contradictions in the development of society were manifested in SFR Yugoslavia and disintegration processes appeared, ie 'counter-revolutionary action' as the communist and socialist authorities in the country said. In addition to the economic contradictions in the development of society, which arose in the mid-1960s, interethnic contradictions and growing 'misunderstandings' between nations on ethnic and national grounds were strongly manifested. During the 80s, and especially at the beginning of the 90s of the last century, the processes of 'ethno-nationalization' took place in SFR Yugoslavia.[3]

Ethno-nationalization of Yugoslav society, as a special trend of social change, was emphasized in the 1990s, especially in relation to social events in the previous less than five decades of the Yugoslav federation. Of course, there have been various manifestations of the aspiration for ethno-nationalization of parts of the former Yugoslavia in the past[4] , as well as certain conflicts of ethno-nations (Milosavljević, 1992) which were united in the 'Avnoj' Yugoslav state. It would be wrong to conclude from the events of the 1990s that ethno-nations became a relevant social fact only in the early 1990s, and that most people in the 'Yugoslav area' only had the opportunity to express their national identity only starting from that 'post-socialist' time.[5] (Bolčić, 2019: 327).

Social conflicts and armed conflicts within the former Yugoslavia, between its republics and peoples, can be more easily understood if we know all the Balkan controversies, embodied in conflicts, hatred, insidious atavisms, mutual extermination throughout history, which characterize every part of the Balkan map.[6]

A more serious study of the phenomenon of nationalism in post-communist countries followed as a substitute for the previously privileged place of studying communism. The new discourse in the notion of nationalism in post-communist societies refers to the 'repressed'. We are witnessing the return of the 'repressed' which is nationalism (Ignatieff, 1993: 2). We have a slightly different thesis about the 'return of the repressed' in the metaphors of the post-communist '*broken refrigerator* ' or '*pressure cooker without a lid* ' [7](Subotić, 2007: 142).

2. BASIC THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Based on existing and available knowledge key to the elaboration of integration and disintegration processes that led to the formation of the former Yugoslavia, as well as its disappearance - breakdown/disintegration, through a comprehensive thought process, we approached their analysis, using scientific knowledge in political sociology, study of nationalism, focusing on ethno-national homogenization as a key factor in these processes.

The main research problem that is the subject of analysis in this paper are: the conflict of Yugoslav society; national homogenization and disintegration processes, in one multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural society. That is, the essence and character of the newly formed ethno-nationalized societies in the post-Yugoslav area.

The basic hypothetical starting point is: *ethno-national homogenization of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia led to the creation of ethno-nationalized societies, with special social structures, which were the main factor in the disintegration of the Yugoslav community.*

3   Some authors use the term 'nationalization' in their works with the same basic meaning as the term 'ethno-nationalization' The term 'ethno-nationalization' is used here precisely because of the need to emphasize the ethnic dimension of the state political community thus established.

4   They have in mind the creation of 'banovina' on ethnic grounds in the 'first' Yugoslavia, as well as the constitutional and legal treatment of republics in the 'second' Yugoslavia as 'nation states'; of certain 'constituent peoples'.

5   It should be reminded that in all post-war (after 1945) censuses, people expressed their ethno-national identity, so belonging to a certain ethno-nation showed, as can be seen from published census data, 100% of the population of Yugoslavia in the 1948 census, 98% of the population in the 1961 and 1971 censuses, 94% of the population in the 1981 census and 96% of the population of Yugoslavia in 1991. So, even in the then 'communist' but multiethnic, Yugoslavia, people declared themselves as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, that is, people of a certain ethnicity. According to the census data, the percentage of those who were of undetermined national identity was small, including those who called themselves 'Yugoslavs'.

6   Much has been said and written about the Balkans and Balkanization, as a synonym for conflict, territorial fragmentation and general instability. It is an important fact that the Balkans, especially its western part, which today, as a geopolitical construction and is officially called 'Western Balkans' represents a contact zone of civilization. In that contact zone, different groups of peoples, their languages and writing systems, religious affiliations, scientific and cultural achievement, meet and permeate. The Balkans is a crossroads of roads, religions and nations, we can say that it is also a crossroads of civilizations (Stepić, 2001: 10, 2019: 30).

7   The first metaphor interprets communism as a kind of a 'freezer' that successfully cooled and 'froze' the old nationalist ideologies and movements in Eastern Europe, which, like fossils in ice, remained perfectly preserved in their original state, so at the moment of sudden warming (ie. failure of the 'communist refrigerator') they revived. According to the metaphor of the freezer, communism has frozen the old nationalist ideologies and conflicts that we now, after almost half a century, find miraculously preserved.

Using a combination of comparative and historical research, we analyzed the contents of certain data sources, taking into account the '*humanistic coefficient* ' as well as the inductive and deductive method, we tried to confirm the hypothetical position as much as possible, especially in her work on the crucial importance of ethno-national homogenization as a key factor in conflict and disintegration of society and state, and its role in forming mono-national societies and states.

1.1. Ethnicity (ethnos), identity and ethnocentrism

Ethnicity refers to the cultural practices and views of a particular community of people that separate them from other communities. The different characteristics of individual groups serve to separate one ethnic group from another, and these are most often: language, history or origin (real or imagined, religion and styles of dressing or decorating or wearing). Ethnic differences are completely learned, and in fact there is nothing innate when it comes to ethnicity, it is a pure social phenomenon that is produced and reproduced over time (Giddens, 2007: 261-262).

For many people, ethnicities are key to building *identity*. Ethnicity provides an important unmatched thread with the past and is maintained through the customs of different cultural traditions. Identity as a sociological concept is multidimensional, so it can be approached in several ways. Generally speaking, identity refers to how people understand themselves and what is important to them. Social identity refers to traits that other people attribute to an individual. Social identity includes a collective dimension. Personal identity, or self-identity, sets us apart as special individuals. Self-identity refers to the process of self-development through which we formulate a unique feeling of ourselves and our relationship to the world around us (Giddens, 2007: 332).[8]

When it comes to ethnic identity, that is, the understanding and comprehension of 'we' is possible only in relation to the category 'they' and in connection with it. 'We' are not 'they' first of all, and then comes the knowledge and certain content characteristics in the present given 'we'.[9]

National identity, in its essence, means the concretization of national consciousness, which occurs as a result of historical homogenization, which is characterized by lasting characteristics of a social group, people, a special lifestyle and a common historical memory. A special group identity is acquired by birth in a certain group, the name and language of that group, it is a reflection of the peculiarities of the natural environment, way of life, family and kinship, value system, and most importantly a sense of separation and difference from others.

Understanding the categories 'we' and 'they' very often leads to ethnic antagonisms, in almost all cultures. Sociological concepts related to conflicts in general, on a general level, are ethnocentrism, group closure and resource allocation (Giddens, 2007: 268).[10]

1.2. Nation and nationalism

During the last two decades, the theme of 'nation and nationalism' has reached the very center of social theory from the margins of specialist, academic and mostly historiographical interest, when a whole new scientific discipline 'studies of nationalism' emerged as its subject area (Subotić, 2007: 45).[11] Here we will highlight the views on nation and nationalism advocated by Ernest Gellner and Anthony Smith, which represent the inevitable 'classics' in contemporary literature on nations and nationalism.

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8   Perceptions of the differences between 'we' and 'they' may indicate a slight degree of mutual differences, but may mean such differences, which stand out as cardinal differences between 'us' and 'them' which also represent beliefs of total opposition, and means the incompatibility of the categories 'we' and 'they'. These differences are characterized by a certain degree of negativism in the attitude towards 'them' starting from comparative neutrality to opposition and hostility. Ultimately, there is a polarization of the categories 'good' and 'evil' so the category 'good' means 'we', 'our' and the category 'evil' does not mean 'our' but 'someone else's' (Pandurević, 2004: 19-20).

9   The problem is not that ethnic and national identity is a historical construct, but the problem is that it acts as a real force (Muršič, 1997: 232). It is not about what really happened, but about what people think about it and how they experience reality, that is, who chooses and represents the symbols of identity, on the basis of which he chooses them and how they come to life in reality. Collective identity is based on social communication. The denser the network of communications, the more pronounced and appropriate the collective identity is (Makarovič, 1997: 167,168).

10   The relationship between 'we' and 'they' ie the suspicion shown towards those who do not belong to the same group, is ethnocentrism. Almost all cultures have shown themselves, and some still show themselves as ethnocentric, which means that ethnocentrism coincides with the stereotypical way of thinking. Ethnocentrism and group closure usually go together. By closing the groups, special borders are formed, as a consequence of exclusion, which intensifies the differences between ethnic groups. Groups that are separate but equally powerful do not dominate each other. However, it is more common for one ethnic group to have power over another. In such a case, the closure of the group occurs simultaneously with the distribution of resources, which leads to inequality in the distribution of material goods (Gidens, 2007: 269).

11   The formulation of a multitude of theories and different methodological approaches, combined with the hyper-production of texts on nations and nationalism, threatens to bring this whole thematic area into a state of 'new opacity'.

Gellner's definition of a nation can be understood as follows: (1) people belong to the same nation, if they share the same culture (in terms of one system of thoughts, signs, associations and ways of behavior and communication). Belonging to that culture, the individual belongs to the nation; (2) people belong to the same nation, if they recognize and acknowledge each other as members of the same nation. This recognition also implies the recognition of certain mutual rights and obligations (Gelner, 1997).

Anthony Smith defines a nation as a named human population with a common historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a common culture, economy and the common legal rights and duties of all members (Smith, 1998:30). Smith's definition of a nation contains two types of determinants: ethnic (origin, culture, myths, history) and political (territory, economy, set of legally established rights and obligations of citizens), ie their intertwining and unity.

Anthony Giddens defines nationalism as a set of symbols and beliefs that emphasize national unity. It includes special ideals, values and 'national experience'. Nationalism actually emerges as the need of individuals to be included in a collective with which they can identify, but it does not offer an identification basis equal to other sources of group identity. National identification is the result of a particularly valuable and significant (national) achievement, something that positively differentiates us in relation to them, others (Giddens, 2003: 214-216).

1.3. Nation and state

The dash that connects the term nation - state contains one question: it is a question of the relationship between the imaginary community of the nation and the territorial organization of the state (Brubaker, 2007). A nation is founded in culture, especially in the language of the state as an institutionalized rule over a certain territory. The dash between nation and state, if not in reality, over time, at least ideologically, began to signify a close coincidence between the two concepts. According to some theorists, modern nations are more a 'product' of the state than the other way around.[12]

According to Max Weber, the state is a community of people that successfully achieves a monopoly of legal/lawful use of physical force (coercion) ..... only the state can ensure the survival of many cultural v regularities that are unique for the nation, for nations .... its function is the social division of labor and concentrated maintenance of order (Đurić, M. 1964).

In summary, we can say that the state is such a legal and political organization that operates in a geographically localized territory and manages certain affairs of the population according to established rules for often forced obedience and loyalty .... nation-state means states whose populations are nationally (ethnically-linguistically) more or less homogeneous.[13]

In the conditions of the existence of a larger number of ethnic groups than the state, as well as their territorial mixing, they lead to highly conflict situations. There is a fear of 'Balkanization' - fragmentation of existing states into small states.[14]

2. ETHNO-NATIONAL HOMOGENIZATION AND ETHNIC ANTAGONISMS IN THE POST-YUGOSLAV AREA

2.1. Social and historical assumptions that led to ethno-national homogenization

It may sound like a phrase, but the objective fact is the claim that the world and the society in which we live are full of contradictions, are in constant conflicts that destroy the social cohesion

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12   The creation and development of a single nation-state is the central theme of the ideology of nationalism, which sees secure, stable and autonomous development only within its own state (Stoiljkovic, 2013). Even the authors of indisputable liberal-democratic provenance, such as John Stuart Mill, starting from the position that the principle of individuality applies equally to individuals and nations, defined the nation as a political community - as a nation that aspires to the state. In order to maintain the peoples' individuality, they advocated the principle: one nation - one state. For Mill, a nation without a state is incomplete because it lacks competent (state) authority for resolving conflicts (Stoiljkovic, 2013-Mill, 1998: 96-104). Seton Watson says: 'The state as a legal political organization with its authority ensures obedience and loyalty of nations, as an organic community, gives a basic sense of unity and solidarity' (Watson, 1980: 126).

13   Georg Brunner calls nation states only those states in which the percentage of minorities reaches 10%; introduces an indication of the state of nationality; a multinational state is one in which even the largest nation does not reach 50%. (Ardai, 2012: 3).

14   When it comes to the relationship between nations and states, ie demos and polis, Linz and Stepan formulate three important hypotheses: 1) the more multinational a state is, the more population, composed of different linguistic, religious and cultural groups, constitutions; 2) democracy in multinational and multicultural societies requires considerable effort and skills in forming and maintaining democratic norms of institutions; 3) some ways of solving the problem of statehood are not in themselves compatible with democracy. On the other hand, voluntary assimilation or leaving a certain territory, ie responsible creation of new borders, with the supervision and support of the international community are among the 'heroic assumptions'; (Linz, Stepan, 1998: 47-48).

of society and communities; we live in a world of discrimination, injustice, armed conflict, which together make up the fate of almost every generation (Mandić, 1998: 3).

Due to the multitude of social, political, ethnic and national contradictions in the Yugoslav state, accumulated over its duration, in the early 1990s people became frustrated, dissatisfied, insecure, burdened with fear of life and the future. In such a situation, people began to seek protection in a group close to themselves, ready to accept extreme ideologies, to obey unconditionally, to accept idols, myths, to invoke miracles and new symbols. In such conditions, people lost in the masses try to find protection and salvation in the narrower ethnic and national communities, which they feel belong to them.

At a time when it was quite clear that Yugoslav society was on the verge of collapse, when it was clear that the federal state was disintegrating and that republican oligarchy was becoming the dominant force, then ethnicity emerged as a refuge for people who became willing to accept extreme ideologies, they unconditionally obey the leader, uncritically follow his ideology and eventually stop thinking for themselves. New ideological and religious fanaticisms appear, due to which man's consciousness narrows and man becomes unreasonable and incapable of judging and logically concluding.[15]

Fear and hatred are a special kind of emotion, which cause conflicts between people, bring misery and death.[16] Antagonisms in Yugoslav society also manifested themselves as: ideological, religious, they created mistrust, lack of tolerance, the presence of hatred and conflict, led to the manipulation of people and their use to achieve the goals declared as nationwide 'our' goals.

Ethnic and national homogenization at the level of federal units - the republic of SFR Yugoslavia aimed at the stability of societies exclusively as ethnically monolithic communities. Ethnic monolithicity is usually achieved through dogmas, by accepting an idea without discussion, by the force of tradition itself. For that purpose, religion was used as the strongest form of stable social consciousness. The individual was not able to think and create, society is expressed in the individual, and God thinks through society. Religion has become the main source of social stability, national and ethnic cohesion (Pandurević, 2012: 7).

In the process of national homogenization, which significantly contributed to the outbreak of war, there was a complete suffocation of individual rights, freedoms or independent action of individuals in relation to the generally proclaimed national and ethnic goals as group ideals. The opposite action was considered 'crazy egoism', something that undermines ethnic monolithicity.

This analysis of ethno-nationalized 'ethno-cratized'), (Bolčić, 2019: 333) societies in the post-Yugoslav area, which does not refer only to the period of the early 90s, but partly to the beginning of the twentieth century, at the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to be questionable for someone, because of the various forms of social processes, ethno-nationalization is singled out as an essential feature of these societies, in some elements of overemphasized generalization, as well as partly due to insufficient 'factual concretization' of manifestations of 'ethno-cratic constitution' of these societies.[17]

Necessary assumptions of the process of ethno-nationalization and ethno-cratization among the peoples of Yugoslavia, which had their concrete consequences in ethnic antagonisms of varying intensity, can be found during the realization of the idea of unification of South Slavic peoples, during the First World War (Ekmećić, 1971) and during the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kingdom of SCS).[18]

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15   That is why Berđaev says: 'The world is not a thought, as philosophers think, who have dedicated their lives to thoughts. The world is passion and passionate emotion' (Berđaev, 1987: 135).

16   When it comes to hatred and fear in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Andrić says: 'Hatred that raises man against man and then throws both opponents into misery and misfortune or drives both opponents underground, hatred that, like cancer in the body, consumes and eats everything around it, so that in the end she dies herself, because such hatred as a flame has no permanent character or life of its own; it is simply a tool of the instinct for destruction or self-destruction, it exists as such, and only until it completes its task of complete destruction'(Andrić, 1981 :.181).

17   If society is 'ethno-nationalized' in all its essential aspects, 'to the extent and in the power of the dominant ethno-nation that 'adopted' society, then this process can be described as 'ethno-cratic 'constitution of society (Bolčić, 2019: 333)

18   The unification of the South Slavic peoples did not have the same significance for all the peoples who participated in that process. After the collapse and disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the South Slavic peoples who lived in it welcomed the opportunity to realize their centuries-old struggle for independence and the creation of their own nation-state.
On one hand, we have peoples who were part of a failed monarchy (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs) with a very strong national consciousness and on the other hand the Kingdom of Serbia, as a fully constituted nation state, victorious in the First World War, which has the opportunity to unite all Serbian people, and together with other South Slavic peoples created a common state. The creation of the Kingdom of SCS was unnecessary for the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro. This act was exclusively to the advantage of Croats and Slovenes. .....The Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro were admitted to the then society of nations, when the world organization numbered 28 states. Regent Aleksandar Karadjordjevic and the then Serbian government had a chance to finally resolve the Serbian national question. It was perhaps the only opportunity in history to create a Serbian state on ethnic Serbian territories under the auspices of the international community (Gaćinović, 2002: 90-91).

The process of unification of the southern Slavs was not easy. There was a multitude of different resistances, generated precisely by the different ethnic and national interests of the constituents of the new state.[19]

The Serbian people brought their state into the new state of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, sacrificed their statehood and national constitution on the pedestal of the new state, with monarchist aspirations to form a new - Yugoslav nation. The Serbs thus found themselves in the process of re-ethnicization and new ethno-nationalization in the process of integrating the entire Serbian people into the new state.[20] In addition to the three peoples of the three-named Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the struggle for their ethnic and national profiling was led by ethnicities with Macedonian names, who Serbs considered members of the Serb people, as well as Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were strongly influenced by religion, as Serbs or Croats of the Muslim religion.

After the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the Second World War, a new political force appeared, the LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia), which during the armed struggle, by force of arms in the form of 'national liberation war' and with a new ideology, materialized as 'socialist revolution', would create a new state, and will in its own way 'solve the national question' in that new state of SFR Yugoslavia. Tito's Yugoslavia, as an extension of monarchist Yugoslavia, emerged as a new 'connective tissue' in the process of completely new ethno-national homogenizations that were to overcome the previous particular ethno-nationalisms and the unresolved interethnic question of the people of the new Yugoslavia. It can be said that two processes took place in parallel, namely, the national homogenization of ethnicity in the republics, which led to the republics becoming states, and the failed process of creating a 'super nation' - the nation of Yugoslavia.

The Second World War in Yugoslavia led to a split in all nations, between communists and anti-communists. The communist idea of a new Yugoslavia was not accepted in the same way by all communist leaders in the republics. For example, the communist leaderships in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the anti-communists, had common aspirations for the realization of the 'United Slovenia' and 'Independent Independent States of Croatia' programs (formed by the Ustashas, the greatest enemies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the monarchy on April 10, 1941, as The Independent State of Croatia - NDH, as a Quisling Nazi creation).[21] There was a strong royalist movement in Serbia, which opposed the partisan movement, as a movement without any national signs.

The partisan movement in Yugoslavia had a truly Yugoslav leadership, but the movement itself was not unique. In essence, it was about separate national movements, somewhat less in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Montenegro, the partisan movement became the national movement of Montenegrins (there were many supporters from the ranks of the green army), which significantly contributed to the creation of the new Montenegrin nation, which was crowned in 1945 by Milovan Djilas. It was difficult to organize a partisan movement in Macedonia. That

19 Even before the beginning of the First World War, Slovenes and Croats were mostly constituted as peoples with their own culture, science, art, language, but not quite clear political will. At the end of the First World War, those two peoples found themselves in a situation of complete departure from everything German and Hungarian, and at the same time they fell under the auspices of the three-named Yugoslav nation in the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The emergence of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was an identification shock for Slovenes and Croats, because they found themselves in the Balkan Orthodox-Muslim community from the Central European, Catholic civilization and cultural community (Nećak, 1997: 19-24). Life in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was a period of 'betrayed hopes' for Slovenes and Croats, because they felt 'unequal with Serbs' and under strong pressure of 'Serbian hegemony and domination', which would be their basic starting point and stronghold in the struggle for their own national identity. the state. This process of ethno-nationalization of the Slovene and Croatian people went through the process of territorial reorganization of KSCS, and then the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (KY), with the creation and reorganization of banovinas. The main goal of Slovenes and Croats was to fight for the strengthening and building of national identity and to obstruct the creation of a new Yugoslav nation. For Slovenes, as well as for Croats, KY was a transit state on the way to the final national profiling and acquisition of its own nation-state.

20 The monarchist Yugoslavia that developed in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, through the internal administrative/political-territorial division, was the main instrument of 'restraining' the Serbian factor. The territory of the Kingdom was divided into 33 areas, so that none of them exceeded the number of 800,000 inhabitants, without the national principle, but according to natural, social and economic circumstances, in order to destroy the 'hearth of separatism'. This principle was valid only on paper. Meeting the demands of Croats, Slovenes and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims, the area was reconstructed and banovinas formed, so that the greatest division of the Serbian people took place. With the creation of the Banovina of Croatia in 1939, 847,000 Serbs found themselves within its borders, so that the Banovina of Croatia closed the 'Croatian geopolitical jaw'. which Serbs would later pay with millions killed and exiled not only in World War II but also in the wars of the 1990s. Tito's Yugoslavia meant the continuity of the geopolitical weakening of the Serbian factor. The construct of monarchist Yugoslavia about a three-named people, which later evolved into 'integral Yugoslavia', took on an even more deceptive and destructive form of Tito's 'brotherhood and unity'. The weakening of the Serbian factor in the common state and endangering the position of the Serbian people followed the creation of instant nations, through ethno-engineering and 'decree-ethnogenesis' which was based on the principle of reducing the number and spatial dimensions of the Serbian people, and thus its 'specific weight' in a common state and geopolitical significance in the Balkans (Stepić, M,. 2019: 270-288).

21 The goal of the struggle of the Croatian supremacy for its own state, a state exclusively of the Croatian people, a state without Serbs, was achieved under the Ustasha leadership (supremacy) of the NDH, which was in the service of Nazi Germany, and against everything that was Serbian. After the Second World War and the defeat of fascism and Nazism, the NDH was also defeated and destroyed. In order to avoid the consequences of the defeated side in the war, the communists, thanks to the partisan movement on the territory of the NDH, which was mostly made up of Serbs, secured the anti-fascist status of the newly formed Croatia, as the future federal unit in Yugoslavia.

process accelerated when the Macedonians were promised a national church, which did not fully satisfy them, they demanded the political constitution of the Macedonians.

2.2. Ethnic antagonisms at the institutional level and the disintegration of Yugoslavia

The analysis of the disintegration of Yugoslav society from the sociological aspect - the aspect of ethnic conflicts, implies the emphasis on certain *structural properties* society and the importance of social processes in new ethno-nationalized communities, not just the analysis of nationalism as the national feeling of individuals, their beliefs and reactions, which can survive as an element of individual and collective consciousness and in a non ethno-nationalized society, as 'subjective nationalist reactions' may in a society that 'systemically' remains ethno-nationalized (Bolčić, 2019).

That is why we will discuss here some basic processes of the ethno-nationalization that took place in the real politics of the leading party-state 'structures' in the former Yugoslav republics and provinces, and which led to the ethno-nationalization of the Yugoslav republics. Such real-policies prevailed over the legitimate structures of the federal state and led to the collapse of the real power and legitimacy of those structures. Economic and political crises have been present in Yugoslavia for decades, much longer than periods of normal social development and integrative social flows.

We emphasize right at the beginning the interesting statement of the Slovenian professor of sociology at the University of Marbor, Sergej Flere, who said in an interview with Radio Free Europe on the occasion of the publication of his new book: 'Anyone who was at the head of any republic of Yugoslavia would fall apart, because their leaders represented their nations, and they strive to separate and form their own state.' (Flere, 2017).[22]

The field in which the republican oligarchy clashed with each other and with the federal state, and which essentially bears ethnic and national characteristics, and not economic logic, is the inefficient policy of unifying the development of republics, relocating resources and investments from rich to underdeveloped - poor republics. As the central government weakened more and more, which made them incapable of implementing reforms, which led to the general dissatisfaction of the republics during the 1980s, the policy of economic unification finally collapsed. Simultaneous processes of 'democratization' ('decentralization') led to the complete disintegration of Yugoslav society.[23]

What were the processes of ethno-nationalization in Yugoslavia based on even later, both after the liberation and in the building of a new society. Efforts to form Yugoslav culture and a single Yugoslav cultural and linguistic space, as an important social connective tissue, did not yield results because cultural workers were the first in the nationalist ranks.[24]

A serious crisis in Yugoslavia erupted in the 1970s when MASPOK emerged in Croatia, which was essentially a nationalist movement. In the opinion of the Croatian communists, the Croatian nation was ready to leave Yugoslavia. That movement was only temporarily removed from the scene, by the strong influence of Tito, but it was never suppressed and did not disappear, but experienced its radical reincarnation in the 1990s. A movement of liberals appeared in Serbia, who inaugurated an independent critical opinion, who believed that Serbia should not have a special responsibility for Yugoslavia.

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22   This claim has been confirmed in some way in practice, as well as in numerous theoretical analyzes of 'dying', extinction', 'disappearing', 'breaking up' of Yugoslavia. Conflicts among the Yugoslav communists regarding the organization of the new Yugoslavia, whether as federal, confederal or for each nation to create its own national state, have existed since the war period, when the Slovenes showed open separatism. At the Second Session of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia), which was held in Jajce in 1943, there were many controversies. Initially, there was no decision for Bosnia and Herzegovina to be one of the republics within the federation, but in a voluntary manner and at the request of some political representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Đuro Pucar, Rodoljub Čolaković, Avdo Humo), it was later accepted that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a republic as well. The autonomy of Serbs in Croatia is not ensured because personnel from Serbia were against it. Specifically, Aleksandar Ranković, saying, 'Well, these are not two nations so distant that they should have autonomy'. The Croatian communists, led by Hebrang, convinced Tito not to federalize Croatia, as was the case with Serbia, where the provinces later received almost the same status as the republics, even dominant in relation to Serbia.

23   The extent to which economic problems broke down in the field of relations between the people and the republics, and the relations between the republics and the federation, is also shown by the so - called The Road Affair in Slovenia in 1969. Namely, Slovenia demanded that highways be built primarily on its territory because it is logical, 'this is the most developed republic' so they demanded an international loan for the construction of a highway in Gorenjska, although according to some Yugoslav rules it did not belong to them. In connection with the above, the report of the Celje Regional Committee states: 'The people are so angry that they are asking Slovenia to leave Yugoslavia'.

24   Only the Novi Sad Agreement (1954) was reached and the compilation of a common dictionary began. Croats claimed that the Croatian language was degraded and were dissatisfied with the treatment of the Croatian language in federal institutions, as were Slovenes and Macedonians. The Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia could not be made either. Each republic and province had its own editorial office and tried to impose its history on the whole of Yugoslavia and the world.

We have given some examples of the behavior of political elites and republican leaders in the former Yugoslavia, to look at how citizens acted on the moves and decisions of their leaderships.

Real-political support by ordinary citizens to the tendency of 'ethno-nationalization' of republics and provinces was often expressed even by vehement reactions, and most often by informal ('street rallies of support', 'in public places') defense of the moves of 'their' leadership, as well as in the form letters of support published in the media, was largely the expected outcome due to the increasingly unstable social circumstances in which people lived in the years of crisis, especially during the 80s and 90s, when the official 'system' proved incapable of effectively resolving causes of the crisis. 'Own nation' seemed to people as the safest refuge in the circumstances when the former institutions and organizations of the 'working people' were collapsed and inactive (Bolčić, 2019: 335-336).

The examples of institutional deviations in Yugoslav society in the federal state described and presented above indicate the ethnic and national sign of most social conflicts. However, there are other opinions that place the causes of disintegration and breakdown of the state in the sphere of ideology. (Jović, 2002). It is about the ideology of 'state extinction', as the central thesis of the cause of disintegration. It is claimed that 'the communist elite believed in the concept of the extinction of the state, so it decentralized its functions to the extent that it became powerless to resist the ideological alternatives that emerged in the 1980s, that is, the state disintegrated because it declared unitarism the main danger'(Jović, 2002).[25] This approach to explaining the reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia cannot provide an answer to many questions, including the question of why the wars in Yugoslavia were so cruel. According to Jović's theory of 'dying out of the state', violence in the war is a consequence of crimes in a ' stateless' space where the state was inefficient, unable to overcome 'private armies', 'private violence' and 'private revenge'. However, the author forgets to say anything about the criminal activities of the institutions of the newly formed nation-states.

2.3. Nationalism and ethno-nationalized societies

The republics and provinces of the former Yugoslavia were established in such a way as to enable the life of the 'nation-ethnicity' which was presupposed to all other needs and interests of people, both individuals and members of other social groups and 'collectivities'. In addition to the fact that in a society that is ethno-nationalizing at the level of everyday life of its members, where people link their personal future to the future of 'their ethno-nation' it is necessary to create an adequate social structure - a structure with governing social rules and practices. Ethno-national society is structured in parts on an ethno-national basis.

During the war, more or less after the war, the established structure of ethno-nationalized societies functioned, and even in some it still functions in a way that manifests a radical distortion towards basic human values. Above all, those actions that are in the 'interest of the nation' are allowed, and even tacitly those that use inhuman methods, when they behave criminally and when they violate the basic norms of humanity. People of 'dubious morals' are also accepted into the ranks of fighters for the national cause, they are made into idols and heroes of the nation, because the edge of the national struggle must not be blunted by anything. (Pandurević, 2004: 81-83).

In order for the creators of ethno-nationalization of their societies to be able to efficiently manage the newly created structures, they established the 'apparatus' of ethno-national states, such as: ethno-national army, ethno-national flows of money and goods. In order to realize the interests of the ethno-national state, appropriate structures have been established in the sphere of education, health, science, social protection, etc. Cultural activity, which could not be established at the level of the Federation, both in cultural institutions and the 'folk culture' received a distinct ethno-national stamp. When ethno-national societies were strengthened, the 'state of national consciousness' was of secondary importance. Ethno-nationalization in the former Yugoslavia was carried out based on various ideologies, in addition to nationalist, such as: socialist, anti-communist, liberal, conservative, royalist (Bolčić, 2019: 336).

In ethno-nationalized societies, there is a problem of the position of ethnic minorities, due to their unequal social position, which are often considered a 'foreign body', 'second-class citizens'. The ruling nation that appropriates society ethno-nationalizes all its important institutions and all spheres of society. A special problem that occurs in the post-Yugoslav space in ethno-nationalized societies, which by definition are societies with a deep 'split' (Bolčić,

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25 It is the only state that has 'died out'. According to Jović, a state based on Marxist doctrine aims to 'abolish' itself, which the Yugoslav communists took seriously, so socialism committed suicide, dragging Yugoslavia along (Olivera, 2015).

2019: 338) is the division into those who belong to the 'ruling' nation and those who are loyal citizens, that society cannot be considered as 'their own'.[26] In modern societies, there is a national affiliation in the form of citizenship, where every citizen lives within the borders of the political system with the same rights and obligations and is considered part of the nation. Although there are people who are political refugees 'without a state', almost every person in the world today belongs to a certain national political order. In ethno-nationalized societies in the post-Yugoslav area, the stated form of national affiliation did not come to life as citizenship. In such societies, the responsibility for full political integration lies not only with the ruling nation but also with ethnic minorities.[27]

Ethno-nationalized societies still face many problems, which modern societies have overcome. It is about the complete structure of society, the social system of values, the social system of promotion in such a society, the system of social sharing and motivation, etc. adapt to the needs of the ruling 'ethno-nation'.

Ethno-nationalized societies represent a regressive direction of the social constitution, where there is a 'return' to the nation, at any cost, which means a return to tradition, turning to the past, reaffirmation of traditional values, renewal of the social role of religion and the like.

Ethno-nationalization of societies in the post-Yugoslav area did not arise only from individual and collective consciousness, but occurred as a structural change in society itself, it is something that materialized in institutions, in social structures, something that strives for its own reproduction. Interruption of the process of ethno-nationalization and return to the previous state is unlikely. That process must be completed, ethno-nationalization must be completed, so that we can talk about some new processes.

Despite the huge movement of the population during the war (emigration, persecution, destruction, ethnic cleansing), the completion of ethno-nationalization and despite the changes in the territorial distribution of ethno-nations, which was the central issue of the war, is not in sight.

In order for all peoples in the area of the former Yugoslavia to find themselves within the borders of their ethno-national states, it is necessary to withdraw new borders between the existing states, which causes a special problem in the entire region and has no international support. Many of their compatriots in other nation-states remained outside the borders of the existing nation-states. Except for Slovenia, which managed to almost completely unite all its citizens of Slovenian ethnic origin in the state-building, political and territorial sense[28] , other nations, nations and states have failed to do so. The closest to Slovenia in terms of ethno-nationalization is Croatia, which managed to ethno-nationalize its Croatian nation to the highest extent, reducing Serbs to a very low (tolerable) percentage (about 4%), who suffer all the negative consequences of ethno-nationalization of Croatian society.[29] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethno-nationalization has taken place and is still taking place in three different ethnic communities (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks). Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a whole cannot become an ethno-nationalized society, although the aspirations of Bosniak politicians to form a new nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been expressed, and that would be 'Bosnians and Herzegovinians' something like the attempt to create a Yugoslav nation.[30] The ethno-nationalization of the three separate ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has cemented the ethnic distance and intensified ethnic antagonisms. In Macedonia, ethno-nationalization is also taking place in two separate ethnic communities, Macedonian and Albanian, which are increasingly distancing and antagonizing, especially under the influence

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26   Vojin Dimitrijevic explains the very eternal logic, argumentation and destructive potential of the collision of exclusive national/nationalist projects, by analogy with the Russian ancient 'babushka', you open one great nation or state, and in it smaller, you open smaller and even smaller. They are all old, just, attacked and seek self-determination, but they do not give it to less than themselves (Dimitrijević, 1992: 3).

27   We have an example in Serbia that members of some national minorities do not want their passport to say 'Serbian citizenship', but 'Citizenship of the Republic of Serbia'. In the United States, there is the American people (diverse ethnicities) and the American nation in terms of citizenship, where all are political Americans. It is similar in France.

28   Slovenia has always been almost entirely a mono-ethnic and mono-confessional society. A certain number of inhabitants who immigrated to Slovenia during the existence of SFR Yugoslavia did not significantly affect the ethnic image of Slovenia. Nevertheless, in 1992, the Slovenian new state 'erased' about 25,000 inhabitants from other republics of the former Yugoslavia, the so-called 'Southerners'. These people were left without acquired rights (pensions, without purchased property, without basic human rights), and some were even deported from Slovenia, above all former members of the YPA - The Yugoslav People's Army ('enemies of war') The injustice was only corrected in 2014 by a decision of the European Court of Human Rights.

29   The condition for the complete ethno-nationalization of Croatian society was 'resolving the Serbian question in Croatia'. It was resolved by expelling the vast majority of Serbs from their ethnic territories. The ethno-nationalization of Croatian society took place on the foundations of historical revisionism and the creation of a new narrative in which the criminal Ustasha regime was glorified and the partisan movement demonized.

30   Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a European symbol of conflict and failure. Aggressive nationalism during the war led to a spiral of crime and ethnic cleansing, so even after more than 27 years, the peoples did not 'reconcile'. The new constitutional order and organization of the state in Bosnia and Herzegovina have created a kind of voluntary segregation. State structures that are mainly ethno-national at the entity level, and at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina coordinating in accordance with the national interests of individual peoples, have led to the completion of ethno-nationalization in the newly formed political and territorial units.

of the Greater Albania program to unite the Albanian people in the Balkans.[31] The situation in Serbia is specific. Serbia is still a distinctly multiethnic society in which the ethno-national homogenization of the Serbian ethnos is not particularly pronounced.[32] Ethno-nationalization in Kosovo and Metohija (KiM) is very intensive where the Albanian people are homogenized in order to create an independent nation state, as the first phase, and then ethno-nationalization continues in the entire Albanian corps to form a single Albanian nation state. Montenegro is also undergoing a process of ethno-nationalization in which political elites seek to 'Montenegrinize' society, complete the process of ethnogenesis, the creation of the Montenegrin nation and the ethno-nationalization of society on that basis. On the other hand, the Serbian people in Montenegro are trying to preserve ethnic and national characteristics, homogenizing primarily within the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC).[33]

After almost three decades since the end of the war in Yugoslavia, there has been no radical change in the basic relationship of conflict between the newly formed ethno-nationalized post-Yugoslav societies. National programs, programs of war policy, which was the policy of realization of previously proclaimed national interests, are still opposed at work (Milosavljević, 1996: 60-88).

We can not say that ethno-nationalization is something particularly bad, especially if it respects minority ethnicities, and that it is justified to criticize and deny ethno-national feelings and ethno-national identifications. It certainly brings negative consequences, but it is a legal phenomenon in the process of constituting peoples, nations and nation-states as products of modern civilization. This process in the post-Yugoslav area was delayed. Nationalism is very vital today, and any critique of nationalism as a political orientation and questioning ethno-national feelings, as a rule, strengthens already widespread national feelings and contributes to the strengthening of nationalism as an ideology.

It is obvious that integration and disintegration processes in modern societies are very complex and multidimensional. The period of modernity is marked by the nation-state as the dominant framework in which the processes of systemic and social integration take place. When we talked about the ethno-nationalization of society, we had cultural nationalism at the center of the problem, which referred to the feeling of community and which is based on the belief in myths about common origin, which is confirmed by similarities in religion, language and physical characteristics. This kind of nationalism, which was at the center of ethno-nationalization, manifested itself as authoritarian, illiberal, archaic and incompatible with current modernization processes. It is a concept of primordial ethnicity.[34]

Ethno-nationalized societies in the post-Yugoslav area have yet to go through the phase of constituting political (civic) nationalism. Political nationalism, unlike cultural nationalism, is also community-oriented, but is based on the belief that a common territory (understood as a homeland) and participation in common institutions lead to the creation of a special national character and civic culture, so that all citizens, regardless of origin, are included within 'a community of common destiny'. The community is based on the moral obligations of the members, from which a cultural public is formed through which the masses rise to the nation.

3. CONCLUSION

Ethno-national homogenization of societies in the post - Yugoslav area is not something completely specific or unique in modern times. These are processes that the history of the

31   Macedonia is one of the poorest societies in Europe. In the process of ethno-nationalization of the society and the struggle for sovereignty and preservation of the name, Macedonia led a dispute with Greece and was forced to change its name to the Northern Republic of Macedonia. Macedonians decided to improve their distant history, looking for the source of their identity in the ancient period by building a modern 'Disneyland', a large complex of monuments with ancient motifs and characters, which reminds them of the 'glorious past'.

32   We can say that the process of ethno-nationalization of the Serbian ethnicity takes place across the borders of Serbia, where the processes of ethno-nationalization were present much earlier. Serbian society has homogenized in various ways throughout its history, fighting for the 'nationalization' of its ethnic territories and Serbian lands. Today, Serbia strives to be a true protector of the rights of Serbs wherever they live, so the idea of a 'Serbian world' was born which would mean a kind of 'federation'or 'confederation' of Serbian ethno-nationalized societies (for example in the parliamentary procedure in Serbia and Republika Srpska Law on the Protection of the Serbian Language is unique). In Serbia, there is also a different attitude towards the history and suffering of the Serbian people and its position of 'victim' or alleged 'executioner'.

33   We can say that Montenegro is a 'hybrid state'. The central question in Montenegro, the question of all questions is whether Montenegrins are a separate people or are they part of the Serbian people with their own specifics? Historical science says that they are part of the Serbian people, but the process of ethno-nationalization is based on the construction of a new political community, a state whose main 'owners' are the political class, which called itself Montenegrins. Today, Montenegrins as a nation - citizenship really exist. This ethno-national dichotomy in Montenegro has suppressed many other essential problems of Montenegrin society.

34   National identities in the post-Yugoslav area are most often determined *primordialist interpretation* - National identity is primarily determined by: language, origin, lineage, religion, myths, archetypes, common destiny and history. (Milošević-Đorđević, 2005: 173, 181).

constitution of nations and nation-states knows well. In contemporary sociological theory, especially in the studies of nationalism, there are known social processes that take place on the basis of ethnic integration and ethnic antagonisms, ie ethno-national homogenization. These processes were particularly strong in the post-Yugoslav area, where after the collapse of socialism and the break-up of Yugoslavia, new nation-states emerged, which developed a policy of homogenization, turning their citizens into members of their nation. A nation is created around a dominant ethnicity, religion or language. The main role in the constitution of ethno-nationalized societies was played by cultural nationalism, primordialist conceptions, while civic nationalism is just emerging in its infancy.

Ethno-nationalization and national homogenization in the post-Yugoslav area has its historical genesis. The peoples of the former Yugoslavia, who in the historical processes of their national and cultural emancipation and struggle for the nation state passed the Kingdom of SCS, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and SFR Yugoslavia, welcomed their final national 'sanctification' in ethno-nationalized societies. Although these societies are more or less ethno-nationalized, they are largely ethnically and pluralized. There is almost no republic of the former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, which is completely ethnically homogeneous and no ethno-nationalized society has included all members of its ethnic group in the territorial and state sense.

Ethno-nationalized societies governed by 'majority nations' face the ethno-nationalization of minority communities that strive for their ethno-nationalization, homogenization, and separatism. Nation-states facing a growing policy of ethnicity must find a way to respond to the demands of minority communities seeking equality and recognition of their cultural identities. The new nation-states must develop a policy of recognition that means the inclusion of minority ethno-cultural identities in the political public identity, dictated by the dominant community, without forcing the loss of their ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity.

Ethno-national homogenization of post-Yugoslav societies and ethnic antagonisms had a significant integration-disintegration function. At one time, these were the processes of disintegration of a wider community, and then they turned into processes of integration of new narrower communities. Ethno-nationalized societies live today, one could say a new stage that is approaching '(de)ethno-nationalization' a process that will certainly be slow and very long. Positive experiences of 'coexistence' and non-conflict of different ethnicities from the former Yugoslavia can serve as examples of coexistence of people of different ethnicities. It will be necessary to reconstruct non-conflict inter-ethnicity and multi-ethnicity, as social realities, but not by mere proclamations and voluntaristic actions, but by changing the social structure and realization of appropriate state and social projects.

Nation-states will remain the most important factor in the new order of the community of sovereign states. The ideology of cultural and civic nationalism will intersect, intertwine and complement each other. The processes of (de)ethno-nationalization will be very slow.

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